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Abstract—Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and
another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each
destination node, when there are multiple potential relay nodes and multiple destination nodes, in the scenarios where the transmission
powers of the relay nodes are: 1) fixed, 2) selected to achieve the data rates desired by destination nodes, and 3) selected so as to
approximately maximize the BS’s utility. We show that auctions based on the widely used Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
have several limitations in scenarios 1) and 2); also, in scenario 3), the VCG mechanism is not applicable. Hence, we propose novel
reverse auctions for relay selection in each of the above three scenarios. We prove that all the proposed reverse auctions can be
truthfully implemented as well as satisfy the individual rationality property. Using numerical computations, we show that in scenarios 1)
and 2), our proposed auctions significantly outperform the auctions based on the VCG mechanism in terms of the data rates achieved
by destination nodes, utility of the BS and/ or the interference cost incurred to the BS.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The demand from mobile users is rapidly increasing
due to the proliferation of new applications such as video
streaming services, online gaming etc. Long-Term Evolu-
tion (LTE)-Advanced [14] is being extensively deployed
worldwide, and 5G cellular networks are being researched
upon [3], to meet the growing demand. Some of the ob-
jectives of LTE-Advanced and 5G cellular networks are to
provide improved cell-edge capacity relative to LTE [29]
and decreased consumption of energy. Issues such as low
signal to noise ratio (mainly at the cell edges) and coverage
holes due to shadowing have to be tackled for achieving
these objectives. As the link capacity of current technology
is already close to the Shannon bound [27], the deployment
of additional network infrastructure such as low-power
base stations and dedicated relay nodes is considered as a
possible solution. However, this involves huge deployment
costs. One alternative to avoid this is to use the concept
of Device-to-Device (D2D) communication [4]. D2D commu-
nication enables a mobile device to directly communicate
with its peers bypassing the base station (BS) [10]. In this
paper, we study a scenario where the BS requests some of
the existing cellular users to act as relays between the BS
and other cellular users to improve the throughput of cell-
edge users and users that experience poor signal to noise
ratio from the BS due to shadowing, and to extend the
network coverage, i.e., the BS employs relaying using D2D
communication. This also replaces a single high-powered
link with two low-powered links, which can increase the
energy efficiency of the network.
D2D communications, an innovative technique for next
generation cellular networks, makes the relaying concept
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simpler with no need of introducing extra relay nodes
in the network [4]. Also, it was shown in [32] that the
achieved channel capacity in cellular networks in which
D2D communication is used for relaying is enhanced when
compared to the case without such relaying. We consider
a scenario where D2D communication occurs underlay, i.e.,
D2D communication takes place on the same set of chan-
nels as traditional cellular communication (communication
between the BS and cellular users) [4]. Note that underlay
D2D communication increases the interference caused to
the traditional cellular communication users. However, it
is shown in [36] that through proper sharing of resources
between the tradional cellular communication users and
D2D users and control of transmission power, underlay
D2D communication increases the overall throughput of the
network.
As relaying of data (to another user with poor channel
conditions from the BS) consumes energy, cellular users
may not be willing to relay, since they would want to
conserve battery energy for personal use in future. Thus,
incentives must be provided by the centralized entity (BS or
eNodeB) to make potential relays cooperate for throughput
enhancement. In addition, although a BS can increase the
achieved data rate of its cellular user experiencing poor
channel conditions from the BS by selecting a relay which
is willing to forward data to it, this will also increase the
interference caused by the relay to its traditional cellular
communication user which is using the same channel. So
the costs incurred to the BS are: the incentives provided
to the relay and the interference caused by the relay to
its traditional cellular communication user. Thus, a BS has
to select relays which can increase the throughput of the
users experiencing poor channel conditions from the BS at
a minimum expense to the BS and minimum interference to
its traditional cellular communication users.
Apart from normal relaying, in which first the BS sends
the message to the relay, which is ignored by the destination
node, and then the relay forwards the message to the des-
tination node, different cooperative relaying schemes [20] such
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as amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward and selection
relaying can be used. In each of the latter three schemes, the
BS (source) transmits the message in the first time slot. Both
the destination node and the relay receive this transmission
in the first time slot. The relay node processes the received
message (depending on the relaying scheme used) and
sends it to the destination node in the second time slot. The
destination node combines the transmission by the source
in the first slot and by the relay in the second slot to form
the received message. Cooperative relaying schemes have
the advantage that they exploit space diversity to improve
the achieved data rate [20].
In this paper, we consider a BS which requires relays
to communicate with some of its cellular users (henceforth
referred to as destination nodes) when the BS cannot commu-
nicate with the latter directly at sufficiently high data rates
due to network coverage problems. We study the problem
of designing a reverse auction conducted by the BS in which
the BS requests some of its users (henceforth referred to as
relay nodes) to act as relays to its destination nodes. The BS
must provide incentives (e.g., monetary payments) to the
relay nodes for acting as relays, since relays incur a cost
due to their battery drain. For an auction to be feasible,
the incentive provided by the BS to a relay node must be
at least the cost incurred by the node for acting as a relay
or else no node will participate in the auction. However,
a relay node’s incurred cost is private information of the
node and is not known to the BS. Thus a greedy relay
node can falsely declare the cost it incurs. Hence, mecha-
nisms are required for ensuring that relay nodes truthfully
declare the costs they incur. In this paper, we address the
problem of designing reverse auctions that induce relay
nodes to truthfully declare their costs for three different
scenarios: 1) Constant power case, where the BS assigns a
fixed transmission power to all the relay nodes, 2) Constant
data rate case, where each destination node requests the BS
for a desired data rate and the relay node assigned to a
destination node must transmit at a power such that the
desired data rate is achieved, and 3) Approximately maxi-
mizing the BS’s utility case, where the transmission powers
of relay nodes are determined by the BS such that the BS’s
utility is approximately maximized. In our model, the cost
incurred due to interference caused by relay nodes to uplink
cellular user communication is taken into account. The
widely used Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [26],
on which most truthful auctions designed in prior work
are based [5], [6], [7], [34] (see Section 2), can be applied
to our network model in scenarios 1) and 2). However, in
these scenarios, the VCG mechanism based auctions have several
limitations, in particular, high interference cost and/ or low data
rates achieved by destination nodes and low BS utility. Also, in
scenario 3, the VCG mechanism is not applicable. Hence, we
propose novel reverse auctions for relay selection in each
of the above three scenarios. Our proposed auctions for
each of these three scenarios are applicable to all the above
mentioned relaying schemes, viz., normal relaying, amplify-
and-forward, decode-and-forward and selection relaying.
We prove that all our proposed reverse auction mechanisms
(i) guarantee truthful declaration of their incurred costs
by relay nodes (i.e., are incentive compatible [26]), and (ii)
satisfy the individual rationality property [26], i.e., the utility
of a selected relay node is guaranteed to be non-negative.
Also, we show via numerical computations that our proposed
auction for the constant power case (scenario 1) outperforms the
auction based on the VCG mechanism [26] in terms of achieved
data rates of destination nodes, interference cost to the BS as well
as BS utility; in addition, in the constant data rate case (scenario
2), the proposed auction outperforms the VCG mechanism based
auction in terms of interference cost to the BS.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. A review of
related research literature is provided in Section 2. Section 3
describes our network model and game formulation and
gives a brief description of various relaying schemes that
a BS can employ. In Section 4, we briefly review the VCG
mechanism and explain the limitations of the auctions based
on application of the VCG mechanism to our model. In
Section 5, we describe our proposed auctions and show that
they can be truthfully implemented and satisfy individual
rationality. In Section 6, we compare our proposed auctions
with auctions based on the VCG mechanism. In Section 7,
we evaluate the performance of the proposed auctions via
numerical computations. We provide conclusions in Sec-
tion 8.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a review of related re-
search literature. Relay assisted communication is studied
in [13], [25], [37]. Here, the BS encourages its users to act
as relays by providing them with incentives. An auction to
enable D2D sessions in cognitive mesh assisted cellular net-
works is proposed in [22]. The proposed auction is proved
to satisfy the individual rationality condition and can be
truthfully implemented. Auctions for data allocation in a
scenario in which cellular users provide their unused data
to bidders by creating Wi-Fi hotspots are studied in [11].
However, the D2D communications in [11], [13], [22], [25],
[37] occur overlay and thus no interference cost is incurred
to the BS. This is in contrast to the model in our paper, in
which the communication between relays and destination
nodes occurs underlay, and relays share channels with users
that transmit on the uplink to the BS, resulting in interfer-
ence cost to the BS, and hence interference management is
required.
An auction conducted by the primary user in a Cognitive
Radio Network to select a relay node to transmit its data
is proposed in [17]. The auction is modelled as an optimal
stopping problem. At the stopping time, the primary user
selects the relay node. It is proved that the proposed auction
satisfies individual rationality and can be truthfully imple-
mented. However, the authors did not consider the cost of
interference due to deployment of the relay in the network
and only considered the problem of assigning a single relay.
Optimal auction based resource allocation in D2D enabled
multi-tier cellular networks is studied in [15]. A higher-tier
BS acts as auctioneer whereas the D2D users and lower-
tier BSs bid for channels and transmission power levels.
The allocation mechanism is based on allocating channels
and transmission power levels such that the total data rate
is maximized while minimising the interference. Our work
differs from the above in that we consider both the uncer-
tainty of information at the BS about the battery energy costs
incurred by the relay nodes and the decrease in utility of the
BS due to the interference caused by D2D communications.
In our model, we not only consider the effect of interference
by including it in the calculation of achieved data rates, but
an additional loss term is introduced in the BS’s utility that
increases with the transmission power of a relay node. This
is done to limit a relay node’s transmission power.
A double auction for optimal assignment of relays in
a cellular network consisting of multiple cellular users and
multiple relay nodes is proposed in [35]. A cellular user is
assigned a relay node only when there is an increase in chan-
nel capacity by cooperation. Three assignment problems are
examined: 1) Maximizing the total number of edges in a
matching, 2) Maximizing the total channel capacity in the
network, 3) Maximizing the social welfare in the network. A
similar network setting is used in [23] with a difference that
now the energy efficiency of the source-relay-destination
link is considered. A maximum matching is found to obtain
an efficient relay assignment. Auctions for D2D networks
are also studied in [12]. An auction mechanism to induce
truthful reporting of private local information in a D2D
network scenario is proposed in [12]. The BS allocates re-
sources (transmission powers) to D2D users such that the
total utility of all the D2D users is maximized. However, the
auctions proposed in [12], [23], [35] do not always satisfy
the incentive compatibility condition. This is in contrast to
our proposed auction, which is also based on maximum
matching in a bipartite graph, but is proved to satisfy the
incentive compatibility condition.
Relay selection schemes in cooperative networks are
studied in [5], [34]. An auction based relay assignment
scheme which considers interference in the calculations of
the achieved data rates in cooperative networks is proposed
in [5]. A truthful centralized single round double auction
scheme to select relays is proposed wherein the traffic flow
users (source-destination pairs) and relays both submit their
bids in the form of data rates achieved with and without
using relays. Later a multi round auction where the relays
are assigned to their buyers (cellular users) sequentially
in a distributed network is proposed. However, the multi-
round auction does not satisfy the incentive compatibility
property. An optimal relay assignment scheme called HERA
in cooperative networks, which considers the selfish be-
haviour of the network users (relays) is proposed in [34].
However, the interference caused by the relays to the BS
or cellular users is not considered as the availability of
orthogonal channels for relays is assumed. Reverse auctions
are also studied in [6] where truthfulness is achieved by
following the second price auction. A relay assisted D2D
communication scheme is studied in [7], in which the BS
is the auctioneer and D2D user pairs are the bidders and
the BS allocates relays, channels for transmission and their
respective power levels to the D2D user pairs. A D2D pair
is allotted a relay if the relay results in increase in its data
rate. The allocation mechanism maximizes the total increase
in valuations (which depends on the achieved data rates) of
all D2D user pairs. In this paper, we too consider an auction
conducted by a BS to assign relay nodes to the destination
nodes. However, in our work the relay nodes are selected to
assist the communication between the BS and destination
nodes instead of assisting the communication between a
pair of D2D users.
In the above works, the transmission power of a relay
is either fixed [5], [7], [17], [34], [35] or selected to satisfy
a certain SINR threshold [23] or selected to maximize the
utility function considered [15]. In contrast, in this paper,
we design truthful auctions for all of the following three
scenarios: 1) the BS assigns a fixed transmission power P to
all the relay nodes, 2) the BS assigns transmission powers
to different relay nodes to achieve the desired data rates
of destination nodes, and 3) the BS selects the transmission
power of each relay node to approximately maximize the
BS’s utility.
Finally, the truthful auctions proposed in [5], [6], [7], [34]
are based on the VCG mechanism [26], whereas in this
paper, we propose novel reverse auctions which differ from
the VCG mechanism based auctions. Although VCG mech-
anism based auctions satisfy the incentive compatibility
property [26], in some contexts, they suffer from some limi-
tations and hence alternative auctions need to be designed.
In particular, the VCG mechanism selects the allocation
that maximizes the social welfare [26]. In some contexts,
finding this allocation is computationally infeasible. For
example, this is the case in several combinatorial auctions
where multiple goods are sold simultaneously to the bid-
ders; truthful auctions that differ from the VCG mechanism
based auctions have been designed for such combinatorial
auction settings in [21], [38]. In some contexts, the VCG
mechanism based auction finds allocations with undesir-
able properties. For example, in keyword search auctions,
where the players bid for positions in the search results,
the auctioneer wants the allocation to satisfy the property
that the bidders that provide the highest expected revenues
occupy the top positions. But the VCG mechanism based
auction does not satisfy this property in general; hence, an
alternative truthful auction that satisfies this property was
proposed in [2]. However, to the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to propose truthful auctions that differ from the
VCG mechanism based auctions in the context of relay selection
in wireless networks. Our proposed auctions outperform the
VCG mechanism based auctions in terms of the data rates
achieved by destination nodes, the utility of the BS as well
as the interference cost incurred to the BS.
3 NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULA-
TION
3.1 Network Model
We consider a cellular network with multiple cells. We
assume that an interference avoidance [24] algorithm is
used by the BSs, and that this algorithm assigns spectrum
resources (channels) to different BSs in each time slot such
that inter-cell interference is negligible. So henceforth, we
focus on a single cell which contains multiple cellular users.
Fig. 1 depicts our network model; in this figure, the cell
under consideration contains cellular users shown by stars
and circles. We assume that time is divided into slots and
in each slot, there would be some users that would need to
receive data from the BS; among them, there could be some
users which request the BS for relay aided communication.
Let D = {1, . . . , D} denote the set of cellular users which
request for relay services. Henceforth, we refer to the users
in D as “destination nodes”; these are shown by stars in
Fig. 1. In order to deliver data to the destination nodes, the
BS would send a relay request to a set of cellular users (relay
nodes) in the cell which are willing to act as relays provided
that they are compensated for their services. Let the set of
relay nodes to which the request is sent be represented by
R = {1, 2, ..., R}; these are shown by circles in Fig. 1.
Information about channel conditions (qualities) is
known to the BS through Channel State Information (CSI)
conveyed by the cellular users. This CSI contains the chan-
nel gains between the BS and relays, between the BS and
destination nodes and between the relays and destination
nodes. This information can be estimated using reference
signals, which are sent at known transmit powers are whose
received powers are measured at the receivers [8]. For i ∈ R,
j ∈ D, let Gi,j ∈ K be the gain of the channel between relay
node i and destination node j, where K represents the set
of possible channel gain values, and let Gs,j ∈ K be the
channel gain between the BS and destination node j (s here
represents the source which is the BS). Also, for i ∈ R, let
Gs,i ∈ K be the gain of the channel between the BS and
relay node i. We assume that all the above gains are known
to the BS. Also, the gain, Gs,i, between the BS and relay
node i and for each j ∈ D, the gain, Gi,j , between relay
node i and destination node j, are known to relay node i.
Finally, the gain, Gi,j , between each relay node i ∈ R and
destination node j and the gain, Gs,j , between the BS and
destination node j are known to destination node j.
Destination Node
Relay Node
Base Station
Fig. 1: The figure shows a cellular network with multiple
cells. We assume that the BSs avoid inter-cell interference
and each BS conducts an auction that assigns relay nodes
present within its cell to its cellular users (destination nodes)
that request relay services.
Now, battery power gets consumed when a cellular user
acts as a relay and it is limited. Let B represent the set of all
quantized battery power levels. Then, in a given time slot, a
given relay node i ∈ R would be in some state bi ∈ B. B
also includes the dead state; node i cannot act as a relay if
bi is the dead state. Every relay node i ∈ R knows its own
battery state bi. However, bi is private information of node
i and is not known to the BS.
The relays assigned to destination nodes (using an auc-
tion) reuse the channels that are used by some cellular
users for uplink (user to BS) communication and each relay
node is allotted a unique channel. In particular, before the
auction to assign relays to destination nodes is conducted,
the BS assigns a channel to each destination node j ∈ D;
this channel is also assigned to a cellular user, say nj , for
uplink communication. Also, a relay node which is assigned
to a destination node uses this channel to communicate
with its destination node. This pre-allocation of channels to
destination nodes, for use by the relay nodes assigned to the
destination nodes, is useful in estimating the interference
at each destination node caused by the cellular user that
transmits to the BS over the uplink using the same channel.
3.2 Game Formulation
3.2.1 Utility of a Relay Node
Consider a relay node i ∈ R which is assigned to des-
tination node j ∈ D. Let Γi,j be the data rate achieved
at destination node j with the help of relay node i. We
assume that the payment made by the BS to the relay node
is proportional to the achieved data rate Γi,j ; thus, the
payment made by the BS to the relay node would be βΓi,j ,
where β is the payment per unit data rate. The utility of the
relay node is given by:
ui,j = βΓi,j − Ei,j , (1)
where Ei,j is the energy cost incurred by the relay node.
The energy cost consists of two parts: 1) cost incurred
while processing the received information from the BS and
2) cost incurred while transmitting the information to the
destination node. Let Pc,i denote the power required to
process the received information and let Pi,j be the power
at which the relay node i transmits to destination node j.
We assume that the total energy cost Ei,j is a linear function
of Pi,j + Pc,i 1 and is given by:
Ei,j = αi(Pi,j + Pc,i), (2)
where αi is the cost per unit power, or, it can be said, the
valuation relay node i ∈ R has for its power. αi depends on
bi and is private information of node i. We assume that Pc,i
is proportional to the data rate, say Γs,i, of the information
received by relay node i from the BS, i.e., Pc,i = kΓs,i [16];
we also assume that the BS knows the constant k.
3.2.2 Utility of Base Station
Recall that we consider a cellular network in which D2D
communication occurs underlay; in particular, we assume
that each relay node i, which is assigned to a destination
node, uses the same channel as some cellular user that
communicates over the uplink with the BS.
The utility of the BS is given by:
U =
∑
i,j
Ui,j , (3)
where the summation is over all relay nodes i ∈ R and
destination nodes j ∈ D such that j is assigned node i as
relay. The contribution, Ui,j , to U from the pair (i, j) is a
function of the revenue the BS gets from j, the payment
made to the relay node i assigned to destination node j and
the interference caused by relay node i at the BS since it
uses the same channel as an uplink cellular user. Note that
each destination node that receives relay service makes a
payment to the BS as compensation. Let a be the revenue per
unit transmission rate obtained by the BS from a destination
node. Also, let Ci,j(Pi,j) denote the cost incurred due to
interference caused by relay node i at the BS when relay i is
assigned to destination node j. Then Ui,j is given by:
Ui,j = aΓi,j − βΓi,j − Ci,j(Pi,j), (4)
1. All our results readily generalize to the case whenEi,j = αi(Pi,j+
Pc,i) + P0 where P0 is a constant.
where Γi,j is the data rate achieved at destination node j
when it is assigned relay node i.
Remark 1. As a simple example, the interference cost may be
Ci,j(Pi,j) = ciPi,j , where ci is a constant, i.e., the inter-
ference cost is a linear function of Pi,j . A more realistic
expression would be Ci,j(Pi,j) = ci(Γnj − Γinj ), where
nj denotes the cellular user on whose uplink channel
relay node i transmits, Γnj (respectively, Γ
i
nj ) is the data
rate achieved by user nj on the uplink channel from
itself to the BS when interference from relay node i is
absent (respectively, present). All our results, except those
in Section 5.4 where we have assumed for tractability that
Ci,j(Pi,j) = ciPi,j , hold for arbitrary functions Ci,j(Pi,j).
3.2.3 Objective
Our objective in this paper is to design reverse auctions that
can be conducted by the BS to assign to each destination
node, a unique relay node. The two desirable properties
of any auction are i) it must satisfy the property of in-
dividual rationality (IR) [26], and ii) it must be truthfully
implementable [26]. An auction satisfies IR if no relay gets a
negative utility under any outcome of the auction [26]. Also,
an auction is truthfully implementable if revealing its true
valuation, αi, is the dominant strategy for each relay node
i ∈ R [26]. Our objective is to design reverse auctions, which
satisfy the above two properties, for each of the following
three scenarios:
1) Constant power case, where the BS assigns a fixed
transmission power P to each relay node. In gen-
eral, in a cellular network, the BS can either allocate
different transmit power levels to different cellular
users (e.g., taking into account the current channel
gains) or assign a fixed transmit power to all cellular
users [28]. Although the former scheme, a variable
transmit power scheme, allows a more flexible allo-
cation, the fixed power allocation scheme is easier
to implement due to its simplicity and also the loss
in performance is negligible compared to the former
for dense deployments of BSs [18], [31].
2) Constant data rate case, where the BS assigns a trans-
mission power to each relay node i to achieve the
desired data rate, say Γj , at the destination node
j to which i is assigned. For example, when a
destination node j streams an audio or video file or
is in an audio or video conference call, it typically
requires a certain data rate Γj . The relay i which
is assigned to destination node j must select its
transmission power such that j achieves the desired
data rate Γj .
3) Case where the BS selects the relay nodes’s transmission
powers to approximately maximize its own total utility
(U in (3)).
Also, for each of the above three scenarios, our objective is to
design auctions that can be used for assignment of relays to
destination nodes under each of the following four relaying
schemes– normal relaying, amplify-and-forward, decode-
and-forward and selection relaying [20] (see Section 3.3).
3.3 Relaying Schemes
In this subsection, we briefly describe some basic cooper-
ative communication protocols, any one of which may be
employed by relay nodes assigned to destination nodes, for
forwarding data. Consider a relay node i which is assigned
to destination node j. In all the following relaying schemes,
we divide each time slot into two equal parts, which we
denote by mini-slot 1 and mini-slot 2. In mini-slot 1, the BS
transmits the message and this transmission is received by
both the relay node i and destination node j. In mini-slot 2,
the relay node i retransmits the message it received in mini-
slot 1 (possibly after processing it), whereas the BS does not
transmit any message. Depending upon the relaying scheme
employed, this retransmitted signal can simply be an exact
copy of the signal that relay node i received in mini-slot 1
or its decoded version. The next few paragraphs give a brief
overview of the operation of various relaying schemes and
the data rates achieved at destination node j through them.
3.3.1 Normal Relaying Scheme
In the normal relaying scheme, the BS transmits its message
in mini-slot 1, which is received by the relay node, but
ignored by the destination node; in mini-slot 2, the relay
node forwards the received message to the destination. This
kind of relaying operation can only extend the range of
the communication or save transmission power but does
not achieve any diversity gain. The data-rate capacity of
this relaying scheme is determined by the weaker of the
two links– the link from the BS to the relay node and that
from the relay node to the destination node. The data rate
achieved at the destination node j is given by:
Γi,j = min
{
W
2
log2(1+SINRs,i),
W
2
log2(1+SINRi,j)
}
.
(5)
where s denotes the BS, Ps is the power at which the BS
transmits, W is the bandwidth of the channel, SINRs,i =
PsGs,i
Is,i+Ns,i
is the signal to interference (Is,i) plus noise (Ns,i)
ratio of the link between the BS and relay node i, SINRi,j =
Pi,jGi,j
Ii,j+Ni,j
is the signal to interference (Ii,j) plus noise (Ni,j)
ratio of the link between the relay node i and destina-
tion node j. Note that W2 log2(1 + SINRs,i) (respectively,
W
2 log2(1+SINRi,j)) is the Shannon capacity of the channel
between the BS and relay node i (respectively, relay node
i and destination node j); the factor 12 appears in each
capacity expression since communication occurs on each of
the above two channels for 12 of the duration of a time-slot.
In this work, we assume that the channel gain between the
BS and the relay node is sufficiently high so that the BS can
adjust its transmission power Ps to make the capacities of
both links equal. So now, the data-rate capacity equals:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2(1 + SINRi,j). (6)
3.3.2 Amplify-and-Forward Relaying Scheme
The amplify-and-forward (AF) scheme is a simple relay-
ing scheme in which, in mini-slot 1, the BS transmits the
message to the relay and the destination node; also, the
relay node amplifies the received signal and in mini-slot
2, it forwards the amplified version of the signal to the
destination node [20]. Apart from its simplicity and low
cost, its advantage is that the relay node does not need
to decode and re-encode the received signal. However, a
major limitation of this scheme is that the noise in the signal
received at the relay node also gets amplified. The data-rate
capacity of the AF cooperative relaying protocol is given
by [20]:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2
(
1 + SINRs,j +
SINRs,iSINRi,j
1 + SINRs,i + SINRi,j
)
,
(7)
where SINRs,j =
PsGs,j
Is,j+Ns,j
is the signal to interference
(Is,j) plus noise (Ns,j) ratio of the link between the BS and
destination node j, SINRs,i and SINRi,j are as defined
above for the normal relaying scheme.
3.3.3 Decode-and-Forward Relaying Scheme
In the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying scheme, in mini-
slot 1, the BS transmits the message to the relay and the
destination node; the relay node decodes the received signal
from the BS and re-encodes it before forwarding it to the
destination node in mini-slot 2 [20]. As a result of decoding
and encoding the received signal, the relay node incurs an
additional processing cost. The data-rate capacity of this
cooperative relay protocol is given by [20]:
Γi,j = min
{
W
2
log2(1 + SINRs,i),
W
2
log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j)
}
, (8)
where the SINR terms are as defined above for the AF case.
3.3.4 Selection Relaying Scheme
Unlike in fixed relaying schemes like AF and DF, coop-
erative communication is employed only if the channel
conditions satisfy certain conditions in the selection relaying
protocol. The BS transmits the message to the relay node
and the destination node in mini-slot 1 as in the AF and DF
cooperative schemes. But the relay node forwards this signal
only if the SINR from the BS to the relay node is above
a certain threshold ζ . If this threshold constraint on the
SINR is satisfied, then the relay node forwards the signal
using the DF protocol, otherwise the BS again transmits
the same signal to the destination node in mini-slot 2 [20].
The data-rate capacity of the selection relaying cooperative
communication protocol is given by [20]:
Γi,j =
{
W
2 log2(1 + 2SINRs,j), if SINRs,i < ζ,
W
2 log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j),otherwise.
(9)
If SINRs,i < ζ , then relay node i is not assigned to
destination node j.
3.4 Some Terminology and Notations
We now briefly explain some terminology and notations
from graph theory that are used in the following sections.
A graph G = (V,E), with node set V and edge set E, is a
bipartite graph if V can be partitioned into two disjoint sets
V1 and V2 such that every edge in E is between a node in
V1 and a node in V2 [33]. We represent a bipartite graph as
G = (V1, V2, E). A matching m ⊂ E in a bipartite graph is a
collection of edges such that no two edges have a common
endpoint [33]. A matching m is maximal if m ∪ e is not a
matching for any edge e ∈ E \m [33].
4 REVERSE AUCTIONS BASED ON THE VCG
MECHANISM
In Section 4.1, we briefly review the VCG mechanism and in
Section 4.2, we explain how it can be applied to our network
model. In Section 4.3, we discuss the limitations of the VCG
mechanism based auctions in the context of our network
model.
4.1 Review of the VCG Mechanism
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [26] is the
most widely used strategy-proof method for allocation of
resources and deciding on the payments to be made in
standard economic models where users are rational. Let N
be the set of players (agents) and |N | = n. Each player i ∈ N
has private information, say αi, called its type. All players’s
types define a type vector α = (α1, . . . , αn). A mecha-
nism [26] defines a set of strategies, Ai, for each player
i ∈ N , from which player i selects a strategy ai. By the
direct revelation principle [26], we can assume that the strategy
of each player is to declare its type. Thus, the resulting
strategy vector is a = (α1, . . . , αn). A mechanism computes
allocation 2 o and payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) as a
function of strategy vector a. pi is the payment given to
agent i. For each possible allocation o, agent i’s preferences
are given by a valuation function vi(αi, o). If the utility of
agent i is denoted by ui(αi, a), an assumption required for
the VCG mechanism to apply is that agents are rational and
have quasi-linear utility functions of the form:
ui(αi, a) = vi(αi, o) + pi. (10)
Under the VCG scheme, the allocation o∗ that satisfies the
following condition is selected [26]:
n∑
i=1
vi(αi, o
∗) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(αi, o) ∀o, (11)
and the payment pi is given by [26]:
pi =
∑
j 6=i
vj(αj , o
∗)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(αj , o
∗
−i), (12)
where o∗−i is the allocation that would have been selected
under the VCG scheme if agent i did not participate in the
mechanism.
4.2 Application of VCG Mechanism to Our Network
Model
The modelled game with R relay nodes denoted by the set
R = {1, ..., R} and D destination nodes denoted by the
set D = {1, . . . , D} can be described as a mechanism as
follows. Each relay node i ∈ R in the network environment
is an agent and has private information αi (its type). In our
model (see (1) and (2)), the payment to relay node i is:
pi = β
D∑
j=1
Γi,jyi,j ,
2. For example, in the context of an auction mechanism, an allocation
may be a vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where Yi is 1 if the good is allocated
to bidder i and 0 else.
and the valuation of relay node i is:
vi(αi, o) = −αi
D∑
j=1
(Pi,j + Pc,i)yi,j ,where (13)
yi,j =
{
1, if i is assigned to j under the allocation o,
0, else.
(14)
Also,
D∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ R and
R∑
i=1
yi,j = 1 for all
j ∈ D. The inequality says that a relay may be assigned
to one destination node or none and the equality says that
every destination node is assigned exactly one relay. Note
that the set of variables {yi,j : i ∈ R, j ∈ D} constitute the
allocation o.
We now apply the VCG mechanism to the following two
scenarios: (A) Constant power case and (B) Constant data
rate case.
(A) Constant power case: In this scenario, by (11) and
(13), under the VCG mechanism, relay nodes are assigned
to destination nodes such that the following expression is
minimized:
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(P + Pc,i)yi,j , (15)
where
D∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ R and
R∑
i=1
yi,j = 1 for all j ∈
D. Also, under the VCG mechanism, the payment to every
selected relay node is (from (12)) αl(P +Pc,l), where αl(P +
Pc,l) is the (D + 1)’st lowest value from the set {αm(P +
Pc,m) : m ∈ R}. The rest of the nodes get a payment of 0.
Note that every relay node that is selected under the VCG
mechanism is paid the same amount αl(P + Pc,l).
Theorem 1. The above VCG mechanism based auction sat-
isfies individual rationality and can be truthfully imple-
mented.
The claim in Theorem 1 that the VCG mechanism based
auction can be truthfully implemented follows from Propo-
sition 23.C.4 in [26]; also, since by (12), every relay node
gets a non-negative utility, the above auction also satisfies
individual rationality.
We now evaluate the time complexity of the above
auction.
Proposition 1. The time complexity of the above VCG
mechanism based auction is O(R logR).
Proof: Relay nodes are assigned to destination nodes
such that the expression in (15) is minimized. This is equiv-
alent to selecting the D relay nodes with the smallest values
of αi(P + Pc,i) and assigning each of these selected relay
nodes to any one destination node. This can be achieved by
sorting the list of the αi(P + Pc,i) values of all the relays
i in ascending order and selecting the first D relays from
this list. The complexity of sorting a list of R values (e.g.,
using the Merge sort algorithm [30]) isO(R logR). Next, the
payment to each selected relay is αm(P +Pc,m), where m is
the relay corresponding to the (D+ 1)’st value in the above
sorted list; this payment can be found in constant time. The
result follows.
(B) Constant data rate case: In this case, by (11) and
(13), under the VCG mechanism, relay nodes are assigned
to destination nodes such that the following expression is
minimized:
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)yi,j , (16)
where
D∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ R and
R∑
i=1
yi,j = 1 for all
j ∈ D. Also, the payment to each relay node is calculated
using (12).
Theorem 2. The above VCG mechanism based auction sat-
isfies individual rationality and can be truthfully imple-
mented.
The claim in Theorem 2 that the VCG mechanism based
auction can be truthfully implemented follows from Propo-
sition 23.C.4 in [26]; also, since by (12), every relay node
gets a non-negative utility, the above auction also satisfies
individual rationality.
We now evaluate the time complexity of the above
auction. We write the computational complexity of this
auction in terms of the computational complexity of the
Hungarian algorithm [19], which can be used to find the
minimum weighted maximal matching in a bipartite graph
G = (R,D, E). The Hungarian algorithm has a time com-
plexity of O((R+D)2 log(R+D) + (R+D)RD) [9], where
R = |R| and D = |D|. Let H denote this time complexity.
Proposition 2. The time complexity of the above VCG
mechanism based auction is O(DH).
Proof: Relay nodes are assigned to destination nodes
such that the expression in (16) is minimized. To find
this assignment, we construct a complete bipartite graph
G = (R,D, E), where the edge weight between relay node i
and destination node j is αi(Pi,j+Pc,i). Relays are assigned
to destination nodes by finding the maximal matching with
the minimum weight. This is done using the Hungarian
algorithm [19], which has a time complexity of O(H).
Next, we find the time complexity of computing the
payment pi to relay node i (see (12)). To find the allocation
o∗−i in (12), we remove node i and all its incident edges
from the graph G and find the maximal matching with the
minimum weight in the resultant graph using the Hungar-
ian algorithm; the time complexity of this computation is
O(H). The allocation o∗−i needs to be found for every relay
node i that is assigned to a destination node. Since D relay
nodes are assigned to destination nodes, the complexity of
the VCG mechanism based auction is O(DH).
The result follows.
4.3 Limitations of VCG Mechanism Based Auctions in
the Context of our Network Model
4.3.1 Constant Power Case
From (15), it can be seen that in the constant power case,
the VCG mechanism based auction selects the D nodes in
R with the D smallest values of the quantity αi(P +Pc,i) as
relays. The outcome of the VCG mechanism based auction
may be any arbitrary assignment of the D relay nodes in R
with the D smallest values of αi(P + Pc,i) to the nodes in
D; note that every such assignment minimizes the quantity
in (15). Thus, the VCG mechanism based auction ignores the
data rates achieved by the destination nodes; hence, the achieved
data rates of the destination nodes under the VCG mechanism
based auction are lower than those under our proposed auction
(which will be described in Section 5.1 and which takes
the data rates achieved by destination nodes into account
while assigning relays to destination nodes). Also, by (3)
and (4), the utility of the BS is an increasing function of
the achieved data rates of the destination nodes; hence, the
utility of the BS under the VCG mechanism based auction is lower
than that under our proposed auction. Another limitation of the
VCG mechanism based auction is that it completely ignores
the interference cost to the BS; this results in a higher interference
cost to the BS under the VCG mechanism based auction than
under our proposed auction. The above limitations of the VCG
mechanism based auction are illustrated by the following
simple example.
Example 1. Suppose there are three potential relays, say
{1, 2, 3}, and one destination node, say 1. Suppose the
data processing costs are zero, i.e., Pc,i = 0 for every
relay i (see (2)); also, a = 2 (see (4)). Let α1 = 1, α2 = 1.1
and α3 = 2. Suppose each relay transmits at the constant
power level of P = 0.25W and let the corresponding
data rates achieved at the destination node be Γ1,1 = 1
Mbps and Γ2,1 = Γ3,1 = 5 Mbps. Let the interference
costs to the BS (see (4)) be C1,1(P ) = 1, C2,1(P ) = 0.5
and C3,1(P ) = 3.
By (15), the VCG mechanism assigns relay 1 to the des-
tination node and the corresponding data rate achieved
by the destination node is Γ1,1 = 1 Mbps. However, it
can be checked that under our proposed auction, relay
2 is assigned to the destination node and the data rate
achieved by the destination node is Γ2,1 = 5 Mbps. Also,
the utility of the BS under the VCG mechanism based
auction (respectively, proposed auction) is 0.725 (respec-
tively, 8.25) (see (4), (12)). Finally, the interference cost to
the BS under the VCG mechanism based auction (respec-
tively, proposed auction) is C1,1(P ) = 1 (respectively,
C2,1(P ) = 0.5). Thus, the proposed auction significantly
outperforms the VCG mechanism based auction in terms
of the data rate achieved by the destination node, BS
utility as well as interference cost incurred to the BS.
4.3.2 Constant Data Rate Case
In this case, a limitation of the VCG mechanism based
auction is that it completely ignores the interference cost to the
BS; this results in a higher interference cost to the BS under the
VCG mechanism based auction than under our proposed auction
(see Section 5.2). The above limitation of the VCG mechanism
based auction is illustrated by the following simple example.
Example 2. Suppose there is one destination node, say 1,
and three potential relay nodes {1, 2, 3}. The destina-
tion node requests a data rate of 3 Mbps. Suppose the
data processing costs are zero, i.e., Pc,i = 0 for every
relay i (see (2)); also, a = 2 (see (4)). Let the power
required by relays 1, 2 and 3 to achieve the requested
data rate be P1,1 = 0.5, P2,1 = 0.7 and P3,1 = 1 W
respectively. Let α1 = 1, α2 = 1.1 and α3 = 2.5. Let the
interference costs incurred to the BS be C1,1(0.5) = 3,
C2,1(0.7) = C3,1(1) = 1. In this case, the VCG mech-
anism based auction assigns relay 1 to the destination
node (see (16)), whereas it can be checked that our
proposed auction assigns relay 2 to the destination node.
The resultant interference cost to the BS under the VCG
mechanism based auction (respectively, proposed auc-
tion) is C1,1(0.5) = 3 (respectively, C2,1(0.7) = 1). Thus,
the proposed auction significantly outperforms the VCG
mechanism based auction in terms of the interference
cost incurred to the BS.
4.3.3 Selecting Power to Approximately Maximize the Util-
ity of the BS
In this case, the VCG mechanism is not applicable since it does
not specify how the transmission powers of the relays should be
set so as to approximately maximize the BS’s utility.
5 PROPOSED REVERSE AUCTIONS
In Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we present our proposed auc-
tions for the constant power case, constant data rate case
and the case where the transmit powers are selected to
approximately maximize the BS’s utility respectively. In
Section 5.4, we provide expressions for the transmission
power of a relay node under various relaying schemes for
the constant data rate scenario and approximate BS utility
maximization scenario.
Recall that the BS assigns every destination node j ∈ D
a channel on which the relay assigned to j transmits; this
channel is also assigned to a cellular user, say nj , for uplink
communication. If destination node j is assigned relay node
i, then we let Γnj (respectively, Γ
i
nj ) denote the data rate
achieved by cellular user nj on the uplink channel from
itself to the BS when interference from relay node i is absent
(respectively, present).
5.1 Constant Power Case
In this subsection, we consider the case where the BS assigns
a fixed transmission power P to all the relay nodes. By
(1) and (2), the utility of a relay node i if it is assigned to
destination node j is:
ui,j = βiΓi,j − αi(P + Pc,i). (17)
A relay node gets 0 utility if it is not assigned to any
destination node. We now propose an auction which is
based on matching in bipartite graphs. First, each relay
i declares its valuation, αi, to the BS. Then we construct
a complete bipartite graph 3 G = (R,D, E), where R
(respectively, D) is the set of all relay nodes (respectively,
destination nodes). The weight of the edge between relay
node i ∈ R and destination node j ∈ D is defined to be
αi(P+Pc,i)
Γi,j
if Ci,j(P ) ≤ CT , else∞, where Ci,j(·) is as in (4)
and CT is a parameter. Let (i, j) denote the edge between
relay node i ∈ R and destination node j ∈ D. Also, let
M denote the set of all possible maximal matchings in the
above graph. For every maximal matching m ∈ M, we
define a corresponding weight wm, which is equal to the
sum of weights of all the edges in m. Let Rm denote the set
of all relay nodes which are in the neighbourhood 4 of D
under the matching m. The proposed algorithm is based on
3. A bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) is said to be complete if there is
an edge between every v1 ∈ V1 and every v2 ∈ V2.
4. The neighbourhood of a vertex v under the matching m is the set
of all vertices which are connected by an edge in m with the vertex v.
The neighbourhood of a set of vertices C under the matching m is the
set {v : v is in the neighbourhood of a vertex c ∈ C under m}.
finding a maximal matching with the minimum weight. If
we denote wmin = min
m∈M
wm and mmin = argmin
m∈M
wm, we
select the relay nodes Rmmin as the auction winners, each
of which is assigned to its neighbour in the set D under the
matching mmin.
We denote for every relay node i, wm−imin =
min
m∈M,i/∈Rm
wm and Mi as the set of all maximal matchings
such that for every m ∈ Mi, we have i ∈ Rm and
wm ≤ wm−imin . If a relay node i ∈ Rmmin , then for every
m ∈Mi, we define:
pi,m =
(
wm−imin
− wm + αi(P + Pc,i)
Γi,j
)
Γi,j , (18)
where j ∈ D is the adjacent vertex of node i in matching m.
The payment given to relay node i is pi = max
m∈Mi
pi,m.
The sequence of steps that implements the above auction
is provided in Fig. 2. Note that the weight of the edge
between i and j is defined to be ∞ if Ci,j(P ) > CT (see
step 2 of Fig. 2) so as to ensure that only those allocations of
relays to destination nodes for which the cost incurred due
to interference caused by relays at the BS is sufficiently low
can possibly be selected.
1: Construct a complete weighted bipartite graph G = (R,D, E).
2: Define the weight of edge (i, j) to be αi(P+Pc,i)Γi,j if Ci,j(P ) ≤ CT , else∞.
3: Select a maximal matching mmin such that mmin = argmin
m∈M
wm.
4: If (i, j) ∈ mmin, where (i, j) ∈ R ×D, assign relay node i to destination
node j.
5: If relay node i is assigned to destination node j, then it is paid pi =
max
m∈Mi
pi,m, else pi = 0 and relay node i is not required to transmit any
data.
Fig. 2: Auction for constant power case.
Theorem 3. The auction in Fig. 2 satisfies individual ratio-
nality and can be truthfully implemented.
Proof: Let us consider relay node i ∈ R. We de-
note wimin = min
m∈M,i∈Rm
wm. Let us assume that node i
is not selected as a relay when it reveals its valuation αi
truthfully. This implies that wimin ≥ wmin. Assume that
instead it declares α′i. This leads to a change in the values
of wm, m ∈ M. As a result, let w′m denote the new
weight of the maximal matching m ∈ M. If α′i > αi, then
wmin = w
′
min ≤ wimin < w′imin. So node i is still not selected
as a relay. If α′i ≤ αi, then node i is selected if w′imin ≤ wmin.
Let M ′i = {m ∈ M : i ∈ Rm, w′m ≤ w′m−imin} (Note that
in this case, w′
m−imin
= wmin). The payment to node i is
p′i = max
m∈M′i
p′i,m. But for every m ∈M′i, we have:
p′i,m =
(
w′
m−imin
− w′m +
α′i(P + Pc,i)
Γi,j
)
Γi,j
=
(
wmin − w′m +
α′i(P + Pc,i)
Γi,j
)
Γi,j ,
where (i, j) ∈ m. But we have wm − αi(P+Pc,i)Γi,j = w′m −
α′i(P+Pc,i)
Γi,j
. Substituting this in the above equality, we get
p′i,m = (wmin − wm)Γi,j + αi(P + Pc,i)
≤ αi(P + Pc,i).
The above inequality holds because wmin ≤ wm. Since
p′i = max
m∈M′i
pi,m and by (17), it follows that the utility of
node i is ≤ 0 when it falsely declares its valuation to be α′i.
Now, let us consider the case where relay node i is selected
and is assigned to destination node j when it declares its
valuation αi truthfully. Suppose node i declares α′i instead
and is still selected as a relay. Then p′i,m for each m is equal
to (wm−imin − w
′
m +
α′i(P+Pc,i)
Γi,j
)Γi,j . But as stated above, we
have wm− αi(P+Pc,i)Γi,j = w′m−
α′i(P+Pc,i)
Γi,j
. So p′i,m = pi,m. By
separately considering the cases α′i < αi and α
′
i > αi, it can
be checked that this implies that a node i which is selected
as a relay when it reveals its true valuation will not get
any additional benefit by manipulating its valuation. Also, if
node i is selected as a relay when it reveals its true valuation,
then the payment made to it is pi = max
m∈Mi
pi,m. Since
pi,m =
(
wm−imin
− wm + αi(P+Pc,i)Γi,j
)
Γi,j and wm ≤ wm−imin
for m ∈ Mi, we have pi,m ≥ αi(P + Pc,i). So by (17), the
utility of node i is≥ 0. This proves the individual rationality
property. The result follows.
Remark 2. Note that in the above auction, an expression for
the data rate Γi,j is not mentioned. The BS can choose
the type of relaying scheme it wants to implement and
the data rate expression is chosen accordingly. For exam-
ple, if the BS chooses the decode-and-forward relaying
scheme, then the data rate expression in (8) is used to
calculate the achieved data rate at the destination node
for each of the relay nodes in R. It can be checked that
Theorem 3 and its proof hold regardless of which of the
four relaying schemes described in Section 3.3 is used.
Proposition 3. The time complexity of the auction in Fig. 2
is O(D2H).
Proof: Relays are assigned to destination nodes by
finding the maximal matching of the bipartite graph G =
(R,D, E) with minimum weight (see step 3 in Fig. 2). This
can be done using the Hungarian algorithm [19], which has
a time complexity of O(H).
Next, we find the time complexity of computing the
payment pi made to a relay node i assigned to destination
node j (see step 5 in Fig. 2). Let Mki denote the set of all
maximal matchings m such that m contains the edge (i, k)
and wm ≤ wm−imin . Then we haveMi = ∪k∈DM
k
i . Note that
pi = max
m∈Mi
pi,m = max
k∈D
(
max
m∈Mki
pi,m
)
. Let pki = max
m∈Mki
pi,m.
Then by (18), we can write:
pki = wm−imin
Γi,k + αi(P + Pc,i)− Γi,k min
m∈Mki
wm. (19)
Next, min
m∈Mki
wm for a given destination node k ∈ D can
be found as follows. Find the maximal matching of the
complete bipartite graph G−{i,k} =
(
V \ {i, k}, E−(i,k)
)
,
where E−(i,k) = {e ∈ E : e 6= (i, l), (l, k)∀l ∈ R ∪ D},
with minimum weight. This can done using the Hungarian
algorithm on the graph G−{i,k}. Let mG
−{i,k}
min denote the
maximal matching of G−{i,k} with the least weight and let
wG
−{i,k}
min denote the weight of this matching. If w
G−{i,k}
min ≤
wm−imin
− αiPΓi,k , then let minm∈Mki
wm = w
G−{i,k}
min +
αiP
Γi,k
, else let
min
m∈Mki
wm = ∞. Next, substituting the value of min
m∈Mki
wm
into (19), pki can be found. Finally, we calculate the payment
as pi = max
k∈D
pki . Since for calculating the payment pi to relay
node i, we run the Hungarian algorithm on the bipartite
graph G−{i,k} for every k ∈ D, the time complexity of
computing the payment pi is O(DH). Since the payment
needs to be computed for each of the D relay nodes that are
assigned to destination nodes, the overall time complexity
is O
(
D2H). The result follows.
5.2 Constant Data Rate Case
The auction for this case is similar to the auction that is
proposed for the constant power case, with the difference
being that instead of assigning a constant power P for each
of the relays, the BS now assigns a power Pi,j to relay i
assigned to destination node j such that Γi,j = Γj . If the
required power Pi,j > Pm, where Pm is the maximum
transmission power of a relay node, then we do not assign
relay node i to destination node j. Closed form expressions
for the power Pi,j for each of the four relaying schemes
described in Section 3.3 in the case when the function
Ci,j(Pi,j) in (4) equals ciPi,j are provided in Section 5.4.
Similar to the constant power case, after each relay declares
its valuation, αi, to the BS, we construct a complete bipartite
graph (R,D, E); the weight of the edge between relay node
i and destination node j is αi(Pi,j+Pc,i)Γj if Pi,j ≤ Pm and
Ci,j(Pi,j) ≤ CT else∞ . The payment to relay node i if it is
assigned to destination node j is given by pi = max
m∈Mi
pi,m,
where:
pi,m =
(
wm−imin
− wm + αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)
Γj
)
Γj (20)
The sequence of steps that implements the proposed auction
is given in Fig. 3.
1: Construct a complete weighted bipartite graph G = (R,D, E).
2: Define the weight of edge (i, j) to be αi(Pi,j+Pc,i)Γj ifCi,j(Pi,j) ≤ CT and
Pi,j ≤ Pm, else∞.
3: Select a maximal matching mmin such that mmin = argmin
m∈M
wm.
4: If (i, j) ∈ mmin, where (i, j) ∈ R ×D, assign relay node i to destination
node j.
5: If relay node i is assigned to destination node j, then it is paid pi =
max
m∈Mi
pi,m, else pi = 0 and relay node i is not required to transmit any
data.
Fig. 3: Auction for constant data rate case.
Theorem 4. The auction in Fig. 3 satisfies individual ratio-
nality and can be truthfully implemented.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 and is omitted
for brevity. Also, it can be checked that Theorem 4 holds
regardless of which of the four relaying schemes described
in Section 3.3 is used.
Proposition 4. The time complexity of the auction in Fig. 3
is O(D2H).
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 and is
omitted for brevity.
5.3 Selection of Power to Approximately Maximize BS
Utility
In this subsection, we design an auction for the case in which
the BS requests each relay node to transmit at a power that
will approximately maximize the BS’s utility. Let Pi,j denote
the power at which the BS requires relay node i to transmit
to destination node j 5. The BS makes a payment of βi,jΓi,j
if relay node i is assigned to destination node j. So by (1)
and (2) the utility of relay node i is given by:
ui,j = βi,jΓi,j − αi(Pi,j + Pc,i), (21)
and by (4) the contribution to the utility of the BS (U in (3))
from pair (i, j) when relay node i is assigned to destination
node j is given by:
Ui,j = (a− βi,j)Γi,j − Ci,j(Pi,j). (22)
For the individual rationality condition to be satisfied,
ui,j ≥ 0 ∀i, j; so by (21), βi,jΓi,j ≥ αi(Pi,j + Pc,i). How-
ever, by (22) the BS gets maximum utility when βi,jΓi,j =
αi(Pi,j+Pc,i). So the maximum contribution to the utility of
the BS from pair (i, j) when relay i is assigned to destination
node j and relay i transmits at power Pi,j is:
Ui,j = aΓi,j − αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(Pi,j). (23)
Since the only variable in the above expression is Pi,j , we
find the power that maximizes Ui,j . Suppose P ∗i,j maximizes
Ui,j in (23), i.e.,
P ∗i,j = argmax
0≤Pi,j≤Pm
(aΓi,j − αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(Pi,j)) .
(24)
P ∗i,j depends on the type of relaying scheme employed by
the BS. Closed form expressions for the power P ∗i,j for each
of the four relaying schemes described in Section 3.3 are
provided in Section 5.4 for the case when Ci,j(Pi,j) = ciPi,j .
The maximum contribution to the utility of the BS from pair
(i, j) when relay node i is assigned to destination node j is:
U∗i,j = aΓ
∗
i,j − αi(P ∗i,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(P ∗i,j) (25)
where Γ∗i,j is the data rate achieved at destination node j
when relay node i is transmitting at power P ∗i,j .
For our proposed auction, first, each relay i declares
its valuation, αi, to the BS. Then we construct a complete
bipartite graph G = (R,D, E). For each pair of nodes
(i, j) ∈ R × D, nodes i and j are connected by an edge
whose weight is U∗i,j if Ci,j(P
∗
i,j) ≤ CT , else−∞. We denote
the set of all possible maximal matchings as M and an
individual matching by m. For every matching m ⊂ E, we
define wm as the sum of weights of all the edges (i, j) ∈ m.
For every matching m, we define a set Rm which consists
of all relay nodes that are in the neighbourhood of D
under the matching m. If we denote wmax = max
m∈M
wm
and mmax = argmax
m∈M
wm, then we select the relay nodes
in Rmmax as the winners of the auction. Each relay node
5. Pi,j = 0 if relay node i is not assigned to destination node j.
in Rmmax is assigned to its neighbour in D under the
maximal matching mmax. For every relay node i we denote
w−imax = max
m∈M,i/∈Rm
wm. A relay node i which is assigned to
destination node j is paid:
pi,j = (wmax − w−imax + αi(P ∗i,j + Pc,i)). (26)
The sequence of steps that implements our proposed auc-
tion is given in Fig. 4.
1: Construct a complete weighted bipartite graph G = (R,D, E).
2: Define the weight of edge (i, j) to be U∗i,j if Ci,j(P
∗
i,j) ≤ CT , else −∞.
3: Select a maximal matching mmax such that mmax = argmax
m∈M
wm, where
M is the set of all maximal matchings and wm represents the sum of weights
of all edges in the maximal matching m.
4: If (i, j) ∈ mmax where (i, j) ∈ R × D, then assign relay node i to
destination node j.
5: If relay node i is assigned to destination node j, then it is paid pi,j =
(wmax − w−imax + αi(P∗i,j + Pc,i)) and transmits at power P∗i,j , else it
is paid 0 and relay node i is not required to transmit any data.
Fig. 4: Auction to approximately maximize the BS’s utility.
Theorem 5. The auction in Fig. 4 satisfies individual ratio-
nality and can be truthfully implemented.
Proof: Consider node i. Let ui,k denote the utility of
relay node i when it declares its valuation truthfully and is
assigned to destination node k. k can be a pseudo user if
relay node i is not assigned to any destination node when
it reveals its true valuation. Then ui,k is simply zero. Let us
assume that relay node i manipulates its valuation and de-
clares α′i instead. This will change the weights of all match-
ings in the set Mci = {m ∈M : (i, l) ∈ m for some l ∈ D}.
Let the new weight of the matching m¯ ∈Mci be w′m¯. If some
matching m ∈ Mci is the matching with maximum weight
w′m, then relay node i is assigned to a destination node.
Otherwise relay node i is not assigned to any destination
node in which case its utility is 0. Assume that some
m ∈ Mci is the matching with the maximum weight w′m
and that relay node i is assigned to destination node j in
matching m. Suppose when relay node i declares α′i, it
is assigned transmit power P ′i,j , and Γ
′
i,j is the data rate
achieved at destination node j when relay node i transmits
at power P ′i,j ; also, let us denote the new weight of the
edge (i, j) as U ′i,j . We then have the following equality:
w′m − U ′i,j = wm − U∗i,j . Now by (1), (2) and (26), the utility
of relay node i is given by:
u′i,j =w
′
m − w−imax + α′i(P ′i,j + Pc,i)− αi(P ′i,j + Pc,i)
=wm − U∗i,j + U ′i,j − w−imax + α′i(P ′i,j + Pc,i)
− αi(P ′i,j + Pc,i) (since w′m − U ′i,j = wm − U∗i,j)
=wm − w−imax + aΓ′i,j − α′i(P ′i,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(P ′i,j)
− aΓ∗i,j + αi(P ∗i,j + Pc,i) + Ci,j(P ∗i,j)
+ α′i(P
′
i,j + Pc,i)− αi(P ′i,j + Pc,i) (by (25))
=wm − w−imax + aΓ′i,j − αi(P ′i,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(P ′i,j)
− (aΓ∗i,j − αi(P ∗i,j + Pc,i)− Ci,j(P ∗i,j))
≤wm − w−imax
The inequality holds because when relay node i declares its
valuation truthfully, P ∗i,j maximizes Ui,j (see (24)). If node
i is not selected when it declares its valuation truthfully,
then we have wm − w−imax = wm − wmax ≤ 0 and if node
i is selected when it declares its valuation truthfully, then
wm − w−imax ≤ wmax − w−imax = ui,k. This proves that the
above auction can be truthfully implemented. Also, since
from (26), the utility of relay node i assigned to a destination
node j is wmax − w−imax ≥ 0, the proposed auction satisfies
the individual rationality property. The result follows.
Proposition 5. The time complexity of the auction in Fig. 4
is O(DH).
Proof: Relays are assigned to destination nodes by
finding the maximum weighted maximal matching of the
bipartite graph G = (R,D, E) (see step 3 in Fig. 4). This
can be done using the Hungarian algorithm [19] and the
time complexity of this operation is O(H).
Next, to compute the payment to relay node i assigned
to destination j (see (26)), w−imax needs to be found. This can
be computed by finding the maximum weighted maximal
matching of the bipartite graph G−i = (V \ i, E−{i}), where
E−{i} = {e ∈ E : e 6= (i, k),∀k ∈ D}, using the Hungar-
ian algorithm. So the time complexity of computing the
payment made to each of the D relay nodes assigned to
destination nodes is O (DH). The result follows.
5.4 Expressions for the Transmission Power of a Relay
In this subsection, we provide expressions for the transmis-
sion power of a relay node under various relaying schemes
for the constant data rate scenario and approximate BS
utility maximization scenario. Throughout this subsection,
we assume for tractability that the interference cost to the
BS (see (4)) is Ci,j(Pi,j) = ciPi,j .
Let γi,j =
Gi,j
Ni,j+Ii,j
and γs,j =
Gs,j
Ns,j+Is,j
. Let Pm denote
the maximum transmission power of a relay node. Pi,j is the
power at which relay node i is required to transmit under
the constant data rate scenario if it is assigned to destination
node j, which requests a data rate of Γj , and P ∗i,j is the
power at which relay node i is required to transmit if it is
assigned to destination node j to approximately maximize
the BS’s utility.
5.4.1 Normal Relaying
For the constant data rate scenario, when relay node i is
assigned to destination node j, which requests a data rate
of Γj , by (6), the data rate Γj in terms of the transmit power
Pi,j is given by:
Γj =
W
2
log2(1 + Pi,jγi,j).
From the above equation, the transmission power Pi,j re-
quired by relay node i is:
Pi,j =
4
Γj
W −1
γi,j
.
Next, from (23), at the transmission power P ∗i,j which
approximately maximizes the BS’s utility, we have:
∂Ui,j
∂Pi,j
= a
∂Γi,j
∂Pi,j
− αi − ci = 0. (27)
Substituting (6) in the above equation and solving for P ∗i,j
6,
we get:
P ∗i,j =
aW
2 ln 2(αi + ci)
− 1
γi,j
.
5.4.2 Amplify-and-Forward
For the constant data rate scenario, when relay node i is
assigned to destination node j, we obtain the transmission
power required by relay node i as in the normal relaying
scheme. Putting Γi,j = Γj in (7) and solving, we get:
Pi,j =
(
4
Γj
W − 1− SINRs,j
)
(1 + SINRs,i)(
1 + SINRs,i + SINRs,j − 4
Γj
W
)
γi,j
.
In the approximately maximizing the BS utility scenario,
we follow the same procedure as used for the normal
relaying scheme. We find roots of (27) by substituting (7)
for Γi,j and as a result we get a quadratic equation. It can be
easily seen that one root is always negative and hence we
take the larger root of the quadratic equation, which is as
follows, as the transmission power 7 of relay node i:
(1 + SINRs,i + SINRs,j)P
2
i,jγ
2
i,j
+(1 + SINRs,i)(2 + 2SINRs,j + SINRs,i)Pi,jγi,j
+(1 + SINRs,j)(1 + SINRs,i)
2
= aW
SINRs,i(1 + SINRs,i)
ln 4(αi + ci)
γi,j .
5.4.3 Decode-and-Forward
From (8), there are two possible cases:
Case 1: If W2 log2(1+SINRs,i) ≥ W2 log2(1+SINRs,j+
SINRi,j) ∀ 0 < Pi,j ≤ Pm, then we have:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j). (28)
In the constant data rate scenario, the transmission
power at which relay node i must transmit to destination
node j is given by:
Pi,j =
4
Γj
W − 1− SINRs,j
γi,j
,
In the approximately maximizing the BS utility scenario,
the same procedure is followed as in the normal relaying
case. We find the root of (27) by substituting (28) for Γi,j . The
transmission power required by relay node iwhile transmit-
ting to destination node j for approximately maximizing the
BS’s utility is:
P ∗i,j =
aW
ln 4(αi + ci)
− 1 + SINRs,j
γi,j
Case 2: In Case 2, ∃P0 such that W2 log2(1 + SINRs,i) >
W
2 log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j) ∀ 0 < Pi,j < Po and
W
2 log2(1 + SINRs,i) ≤ W2 log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j)∀ Po ≤ Pi,j ≤ Pm.
6. When P ∗i,j < 0, we set P
∗
i,j = 0 and when P
∗
i,j > Pm, we set
P ∗i,j = Pm. This process is followed for all the relaying schemes.
7. The transmission power is 0 if both roots are negative.
In the constant data rate scenario, in the case when
0 < Pi,j < Po, we have W2 log2 (1 + SINRs,i) >
W
2 log2 (1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j); so:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2 (1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j)
The expression for Pi,j in this case is the same as in Case
1. In the case when Po ≤ Pi,j ≤ Pm, we have W2 log2(1 +
SINRs,i) ≤ W2 log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j); so:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2(1 + SINRs,i).
Since the data rate is independent of Pi,j , we set Pi,j = Po
as this will minimize the interference cost to the BS (see (4)).
In the approximately maximizing the BS utility scenario,
in Case 2, we find the maximum contribution to the utility of
the BS across the two cases: 0 < P ∗i,j < Po and Po ≤ P ∗i,j <
Pm. When we assume that 0 < P ∗i,j < Po, we substitute
Γi,j =
W
2 log2 (1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j) in (27) and obtain
the transmission power P ∗i,j that maximizes (23). If P
∗
i,j ≥
Po, then we set P ∗i,j = Po and if P
∗
i,j < 0, we set P
∗
i,j = 0.
We find the corresponding contribution to the utility of the
BS (see (4)) which we denote by U∗1 . Next, we repeat the
process assuming that Po ≤ P ∗i,j < Pm. In this case we
substitute W2 log2 (1 + SINRs,i) as the expression for data
rate in (27). It can be seen that P ∗i,j = Po. We calculate the
corresponding contribution to the BS utility (see (4)), which
we denote by U∗2 . If U
∗
1 > U
∗
2 , then the expression for P
∗
i,j is
similar to the one obtained in Case 1, else P ∗i,j = Po.
5.4.4 Selection Relaying
From (9), the capacity of the selection relaying protocol if
relay node i is assigned to destination node j is given by:
Γi,j =
W
2
log2(1 + SINRs,j + SINRi,j).
The expressions for transmission powers are the same as
those given in Case 1 of the decode-and-forward relaying
scheme. Note that if SINRi,j < ζ , then relay i is not
assigned to destination node j.
6 COMPARISON OF PROPOSED AUCTIONS WITH
VCG MECHANISM BASED AUCTIONS
We now compare the proposed auctions with those based
on the VCG mechanism.
6.1 Constant Power Case
In this scenario, in the proposed auction, relay nodes are
assigned to destination nodes such that the following ex-
pression is minimized (see Fig. 2):
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(P + Pc,i)
Γi,j
yi,j , (29)
whereas in the VCG mechanism, relay nodes are assigned
to destination nodes such that the following expression is
minimized (see (15)):
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(P + Pc,i)yi,j , (30)
where
D∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ R and
R∑
i=1
yi,j = 1 for all
j ∈ D. From (29), it can be seen that the data rates Γi,j
appear in the denominators of the terms in the quantity
that the proposed auction seeks to minimize. Hence, the
proposed auction tends to assign relay nodes to destina-
tion nodes in such a way that the achieved data rates at
destination nodes are high. On the other hand, from (30), it
can be seen that the VCG mechanism based auction ignores
the data rates Γi,j . Also, by (3) and (4), the utility of the BS
is an increasing function of the achieved data rates of the
destination nodes; hence, under the proposed auction, the
utility of the BS tends to be high. Next, note that under
the proposed auction, only those allocations of relays to
destination nodes for which the costs (Ci,j(·)) incurred due
to interference caused by relays at the BS are sufficiently
low can possibly be selected (see step 2 in Fig. 2); on the
other hand, the VCG mechanism based auction ignores the
interference cost. Due to the above reasons, the proposed
auction outperforms the VCG mechanism based auction in terms
of the data rates achieved by the destination nodes, the utility of
the BS as well as the interference cost to the BS; this is confirmed
by the numerical results in Section 7.
6.2 Constant Data Rate Case
In this case, the proposed auction assigns relay nodes to
destination nodes such that the following expression is
minimized (see Fig. 3):
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)
Γj
yi,j . (31)
But by (16), under the VCG mechanism, relay nodes are
assigned to destination nodes such that the following ex-
pression is minimized:
D∑
j=1
R∑
i=1
αi(Pi,j + Pc,i)yi,j , (32)
where
D∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ R and
R∑
i=1
yi,j = 1 for all
j ∈ D. It can be easily verified that the assignment of relay
nodes to destination nodes under the proposed auction may
differ from that under the VCG mechanism. Next, note that
under the proposed auction, only those allocations of relays
to destination nodes for which the costs (Ci,j(·)) incurred
due to interference caused by relays at the BS are sufficiently
low can possibly be selected (see step 2 in Fig. 3); on the
other hand, the VCG mechanism based auction ignores the
interference cost. Due to this, the proposed auction outperforms
the VCG mechanism based auction in terms of the interference
cost to the BS; this is confirmed by the numerical results in
Section 7.
6.3 Selecting Power to Approximately Maximize the
Utility of the BS
As mentioned earlier, in this case, the VCG mechanism is not
applicable since it does not specify how the transmission
power should be set so as to approximately maximize the
BS’s utility.
TABLE 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Cell type Hexagonal
Cell radius 300 m
Propagation Model
Path loss with lognormal
shadow fading and Rayleigh
fading
a 0.25 units per Mbps
ci 0.5a
Battery state Uni. dist. in {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}
Channel Bandwidth (W ) 10 MHz
Noise power -174dBm/Hz
Standard deviation for shadow fading 8
Path loss Exponent 3.3
No. of destination nodes 10
Pm 24dBm
Ps 4 W
Interference Threshold (CT ) 2.5 units
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of
the proposed auctions and compare it with that of the VCG
mechanism based auctions.
A hexagonal cell of radius 300 meters is considered with
the relay nodes, destination nodes and the cellular users,
which transmit on the uplink to the BS, placed using a
uniform random distribution in the cell. At the beginning,
we assign each channel to one destination node and one
cellular user for uplink communication. If a relay node, say
i, is assigned to a destination node, say j, during the auction,
then i transmits to j on the channel assigned to j. For
modelling the channel, we considered distance dependent
path loss along with lognormal shadow fading. Also, the
channel is assumed to undergo Rayleigh fading. The battery
state, bi, of each relay node i ∈ R is assumed to be
distributed uniformly at random in the set {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}.
The value of αi is taken to be the reciprocal of the battery
state value bi. Let the bandwidth of each channnel be W .
Throughout, we take the number of destination nodes that
request for relay services and the number of cellular users
that transmit on the uplink in a given time slot to be 10. We
take the interference cost to be Ci,j(Pi,j) = ci(Γnj − Γinj )
(see Remark 1).
We evaluated the performance of the proposed and VCG
mechanism based auctions under various relaying schemes
in terms of the following metrics: data rates achieved by the
destination nodes, utility of the BS and interference cost to
the BS. We repeated each experiment 100 times and each
time, independently, the channel gains and battery states
were randomly chosen according to their distributions; the
average values of the metrics over all the runs are depicted
in the following plots.
The simulation parameters are given in Table 1.
7.1 Constant Power Case
The transmission power of each relay node was fixed at
P = 0.25 W, while increasing the number of available relay
nodes from 20 to 100. Fig. 5 shows the average data rate
achieved per destination node versus the number of relay
nodes for each of the four relaying schemes described in
Section 3.3. From the figure, it can be seen that for all four
relaying schemes, the proposed auction outperforms the VCG
mechanism based auction in terms of the achieved data rates.
Similarly, Fig. 6 (respectively, Fig. 7) compares the average
BS utility (respectively, the average interference cost to the
BS
(
1
D
∑R
i=1
∑D
j=1 Ci,j(P )yi,j
)
) under the two auctions; it
shows that for all four relaying schemes, the proposed auction
outperforms the VCG mechanism based auction in terms of the
average BS utility (respectively, average interference cost to the
BS). The reasons for the trends in Figs. 5, 6 and 7 are
explained in Section 6.1.
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Fig. 5: The plots compare the average data rates achieved by
destination nodes under the proposed auction with those
under the VCG mechanism for various numbers of relay
nodes and various relaying schemes for the constant power
case.
7.2 Constant Data Rate Case
Fig. 8 compares the performance of the proposed auction
with that of the VCG mechanism based auction in terms
of the BS utility for the constant data rate case and all
four relaying schemes. The two auctions perform similarly
in terms of the BS utility. Intuitively, this is because of (3)
and (4) and the fact that in the constant data rate case, the
data rates at the destination nodes are the same (Γj) for
both the proposed auction and the VCG mechanism based
auction. Fig. 9 compares the average interference cost to the
BS under the two auctions for the four relaying schemes.
The figure shows that the proposed auction outperforms the
VCG mechanism based auction for all four relaying schemes in
terms of the average interference cost to the BS; the reason for
this trend is explained in Section 6.2.
7.3 Selection of Transmit Power to Approximately Max-
imize the BS’s Utility
We compare the BS’s utility under the proposed auction
with that under an auction for a hypothetical case, where
nodes are assumed to always truthfully reveal their valua-
tions αi. The latter auction makes the same assignment of
relay nodes to destination nodes as in the proposed auction,
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Fig. 6: The plots compare the average BS utilities under the
proposed auction with those under the VCG mechanism
for various numbers of relay nodes and various relaying
schemes for the constant power case.
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Fig. 7: The plots compare the average costs of interference
to the BS under the proposed auction with those under the
VCG mechanism for various numbers of relay nodes and
various relaying schemes for the constant power case.
but if relay node i is assigned to destination node j, then the
former is paid αi(P ∗i,j + Pc,i), i.e., each relay node is paid
only its incurred cost. This is in contrast to the proposed auc-
tion where each selected relay node i is paid an additional
wmax − w−imax (see (26)). The plots in Fig. 10 show that the
BS’s utility under the proposed auction is lower than that
under the auction for the hypothetical case; this is because,
when relay nodes may falsely declare their valuations (as in
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Fig. 8: The plots compare the average BS utilities under the
proposed auction with those under the VCG mechanism for
various numbers of relay nodes and for various relaying
schemes for the constant data rate case.
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Fig. 9: The plots compare the average interference costs to
the BS under the proposed auction with those under the
VCG mechanism for various numbers of relay nodes and
for various relaying schemes for the constant data rate case.
practice), they need to be paid more to incentivize them to
truthfully declare their valuations. However, as the number
of available relay nodes increases, the BS utilities under both
the auctions increase, but the difference between the utilities
changes very little. Thus the proposed auction performs
well even in large networks.
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Fig. 10: In the BS utility maximisation case, for various
relaying schemes and various numbers of available relay
nodes, the above plots compare the average BS utilities
under the proposed auction with those under the auction
for the hypothetical case, which is similar to the former with
the difference that every relay node is assumed to truthfully
reveal its valuation and is paid only its incurred cost.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We considered a scenario in which some cellular users
can relay data over D2D links to other cellular users with
poor direct channel conditions from the BS. We addressed
the problem of designing reverse auction mechanisms to
assign a relay node to each destination node when there
are multiple potential relay nodes and multiple destination
nodes in each of the following three scenarios: 1) when relay
nodes are allocated a fixed transmission power, 2) when
relay nodes are allocated the transmission powers required
to achieve the data rates desired by the destination nodes,
and 3) when the transmission powers of relay nodes are
selected so as to approximately maximize the BS’s utility.
We showed that in scenarios 1) and 2), auctions based on
the widely used VCG mechanism have several limitations,
in particular, high interference cost and/ or low data rates
achieved by destination nodes and low BS utility; also, in
scenario 3), the VCG mechanism is not applicable. Hence,
we proposed novel reverse auctions for relay selection in
each of the above three scenarios. We proved that all the
proposed reverse auctions can be truthfully implemented
as well as satisfy the individual rationality property. Using
numerical computations, we showed that in the fixed trans-
mission power scenario, our proposed auction significantly
outperforms an auction based on the widely used VCG
mechanism in terms of the data rates achieved by the
destination nodes, the utility of the BS and as well as the
interference cost incurred to the BS; also, in the constant
data rate case, our proposed auction outperforms the VCG
mechanism based auction in terms of the interference cost
to the BS. Our proposed auctions are applicable to a vari-
ety of relaying schemes such as Normal relaying, Decode-
and-Forward relaying, Amplify-and-Forward relaying and
Selection relaying.
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